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**POLICING BY UNITED NATIONS**

by

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## UNITED NATIONS POLICING

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**D**ISPATCH of an international armed force to the Middle East, to patrol the danger zones between Israel and the Suez Canal, opened a new chapter for the United Nations. The action in 1950 to repel Communist aggression in Korea was carried out in the name of the world organization, but the United States played so dominant a part in that operation that the participation of other nations, with the exception of the Republic of Korea itself, was almost lost to view. The U.N. Emergency Force in the Middle East, composed of small contingents from small countries<sup>1</sup> and functioning under direct United Nations control, has a more truly international character.

- The relative ease and speed which marked creation and organization of UNEF—ten days from adoption of the General Assembly resolution to arrival of the first contingents in Egypt—revived hopes that the United Nations might after all find a dependable and effective way to bring military force to bear for enforcement of peace. Charter provisions to put armed contingents at the disposal of the Security Council had long since been reduced to nullity by lack of agreement between East and West; the Council had been able to act at all on Korea only because the representative of the Soviet Union was fortuitously not present to veto U.N. intervention.

In the Middle East case the General Assembly, unimpeded by any veto privilege, managed to break new ground and rush troops to the scene of trouble—not fast enough to have stopped a determined military push but in time to help stabilize a potentially dangerous situation. This demonstration of what could be done at brief notice brought proposals for establishment of a standing U.N. military force, capable of being moved with utmost celerity and in impressive strength against an aggressor.

<sup>1</sup> Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, India, Indonesia, Norway, Sweden, Yugoslavia. India, by exception, is a large country in terms of population though not yet ranking as a great power.

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Whether such proposals will come to any more now than in the past may depend in the final instance on the success or failure of the Middle East police mission. The chances presumably will be favorable if presence of the U.N. force contributes conspicuously to settlement of the Suez Canal problem and of the long-standing difficulties between Israel and its neighbors. In the meantime, by way of reinsurance, President Eisenhower has asked Congress for authority to send American forces into action in the Middle East in event of "Communist armed aggression." Such authority would enable the United States, either in response to a U.N. request or in exercise of the inherent right of self-defense, to take the kind of action which the United Nations itself is incapable of taking without the striking force with which the Charter intended that it be armed.

**COMPLICATIONS IN ESTABLISHING U.N. ARMED FORCE**

Organization of an international armed force, whether to repel military aggression or merely to keep order in a disturbed area, involves various complications. The task would be simplified if the United Nations could recruit and train an independent force, composed of individuals of any nationality who would pledge sole loyalty to the world organization. Creation of a U.N. military or police arm of this sort, comparable to the U.N. Secretariat of international civil servants, might be feasible if the United Nations were a world government with a constitution and a body of statute law binding on member countries and their citizens. Then it would be logical to set up a world police force to exact observance of constitution and statutes.

As it is, however, every member of the United Nations is a sovereign, independent country, theoretically the equal of every other member, and what is called international law does not constitute an adequate rule book for keeping order among nations. Although U.N. members may be willing to contribute contingents of national armed forces to an international force, the big powers in particular are not prepared to consent to creation of a U.N. army, navy, air force, or police force strong enough to make them individually toe the mark. Proposals for U.N. policing thus contain the seeds of possible controversy between large and small countries.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization's experience in setting up an international command structure and in plan-

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ning for mutual defense of the NATO area has provided valuable lessons in problems involved in merging the military efforts of a number of nations. Lessons in the actual assembly, movement, and management of a multi-nation armed force now are being added by the U.N. police venture in Egypt. The United Nations in the latter case obviously has been feeling its way. While intent upon assuring the success of the mission, it has not insisted on pinning down all the conditions and details in advance. In the end, this step-by-step approach, necessarily taking into account the practical considerations imposed by developing events, may produce a more effective force, and a more persuasive example of international policing, than would have resulted from following some theoretical blueprint.

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### **Development of International Policing**

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STRICTLY SPEAKING, police action, though executed by military contingents, is action taken to enforce law or maintain order. It nevertheless has been difficult to distinguish between police action and war in some instances, because "State sovereignty and individual-state control of military powers have . . . kept force harnessed to politics instead of law."

The difference between war and policing is the difference between anarchy and community, between individual aggrandizement and common welfare. . . . Policing implies that the force in the community is under community control and is used only against those who break the community law. . . . The difference between an army and a police force is of supreme importance. The former is primarily a political instrument subject to the demands of national policy and ready for use regardless of international legal considerations. Armies are products of international instability and insecurity. A police force, on the other hand, is an agent of the law, a necessary ingredient of any system of order.<sup>2</sup>

Because national armed forces are still very much in being, any international force must be organized and equipped on similar lines if it is to perform successfully the function of stopping aggression. The distinction between armies and police forces, therefore, remains blurred. The U.N.

<sup>2</sup> Payson S. Wild, Jr., "The Distinction Between War and International Policing," *Some Problems of International Policing* (Council on Foreign Relations, 1944), pp. 4-5.

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- command in Korea was made up of army, navy, and air units and fought what was a war to all intents and purposes. The U.N. Emergency Force in Egypt, composed largely of lightly armed ground contingents and engaged so far only in patrol and garrison duty, corresponds more closely to police-force specifications.

#### **JOINT POLICE ACTION; ARMING OF LEAGUE OF NATIONS**

- Although no formal authority for international policing existed before the League of Nations came into being in 1920, joint police action had been improvised on various occasions as the need arose. The largest operation of the sort occurred in 1900, when eight countries—Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Russia, and the United States—dispatched armed forces to China to rescue foreigners besieged in Peking during the Boxer Rebellion. Five thousand American troops were included in the joint relief expedition of 20,000 men, under British command, which finally accomplished that mission.<sup>8</sup>

Proposals to furnish the League of Nations with armed force to keep the peace were considerably watered down in the writing of the Covenant. President Wilson had said in an address before the Senate on Jan. 22, 1917:

It will be absolutely necessary that a force be created as a guarantor of the permanency of the [peace] settlement so much greater than the force of any nation now engaged or any alliance hitherto formed or projected that no nation, no probable combination of nations, could face or withstand it. If the peace presently to be made is to endure, it must be peace made secure by the organized major force of mankind.

- At the Paris peace conference in 1919 France sponsored a plan which would have required League members to keep fixed contingents of their national forces available for service in an international force, which was to be strong enough "to overcome in case of need any forces which may be opposed to the League of Nations in the event of armed conflict." The French plan called also for a "permanent international staff" to deal with "everything relating to the organization of the joint forces and eventual conduct of military operations."

- By this time, however, other great powers had discovered insuperable obstacles to any such scheme. Lord Robert

<sup>8</sup> For details and other examples of joint police action before World War I, see "International Policing," *E.R.R.*, Vol. II 1947, pp. 852-854.

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Cecil said at Paris that, "unless the impending danger was in full view," no portion of the British army could be placed "under the command of a general who was not a British subject." President Wilson himself felt that before any American armed forces "could be placed permanently under foreign or even international control, an amendment of the Constitution would be required."<sup>4</sup>

The Covenant in final form made it the duty of the League Council, if a member state resorted to war in disregard of its obligations, to "recommend to the several governments concerned what effective military, naval, or air force the members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League." No provision was made for advance arrangements of any kind. The Council could act only by unanimous vote of members present, and a League Assembly resolution made it plain in 1923 that the Council was powerless to bring about compliance with its recommendations. Despite the Covenant's use of the verb "shall," the resolution declared that it was up to each member state to decide for itself whether or not to contribute military forces.

France sought, through the abortive Geneva Protocol of 1924, to obtain authorization for advance agreements on the armed forces which states would bring into action against an aggressor. Another French program, submitted to the Disarmament Conference in 1932, proposed to link restrictions on so-called aggressive weapons with a new plan for an international police force. The plan included earmarking of military, naval, and air contingents for a League force and immediate transfer of all the largest aircraft to a bombing force under exclusive League control. However, such suggestions got nowhere in the inter-war period. The only time the League of Nations applied sanctions, against Italy in 1935-36, no thought was given to supplementing economic and financial pressure by military measures.

#### **U.N. CHARTER PROVISIONS FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE**

Consideration given during World War II to means of reforming and strengthening international machinery to enforce peace led to the conclusion that a new world organization must have armed force at its disposal. Students

<sup>4</sup> Stephen Bonsal, *Unfinished Business* (1944), pp. 185-186.

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of international affairs put forward various schemes to that end. The plan finally incorporated in the United Nations Charter resembled proposals repeatedly advanced by France during the preceding 25 years. Although making no provision for a standing international police force, it seemed at first to give promise of enabling the United Nations to speak and act with compelling authority:

Entrusting peace enforcement primarily to the Security Council, the Charter made it the duty of that body, when it found a threat to or a breach of the peace, to "make recommendations or decide what measures shall be taken . . . to maintain or restore international peace and security." If the Council considered economic sanctions inadequate for that purpose, it was empowered to "take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary."

To enable the Council to proceed to apply force on its own motion, Article 43 made the following provisions:

1. All members of the United Nations . . . undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.
2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.

Article 45 of the Charter stipulated in addition that, "In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action." The strength and degree of readiness of these special contingents, and plans for their combined action, were to be determined by the Security Council with the assistance of its Military Staff Committee.

The Military Staff Committee, composed of the chiefs of staff, or representatives of the chiefs of staff, of the five permanent members of the Security Council (France, Great Britain, Nationalist China, Soviet Russia, and the United States), was to advise and assist the Council on all military matters. Questions relating to command of forces called to U.N. service were to be worked out later, but the Charter made the Military Staff Committee "responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council."

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Framers of the U.N. Charter sought to repair a defect of the League Covenant by making it mandatory on individual members to implement Council decisions to use force against an aggressor. The contingents needed from member states must be furnished on call of the Security Council, once the special agreements regulating such contributions have been negotiated and ratified. By the United Nations Participation Act of 1945, Congress authorized the President to negotiate such an agreement for the United States and made it subject to approval by majority vote of Senate and House. Following such approval, the agreed American contingents could be placed at the disposal of the Security Council by the President without consulting Congress, but they could not be enlarged without its consent.<sup>5</sup>

Pending negotiation and ratification of a sufficient number of the special military agreements, the Charter provided that the permanent members of the Security Council should "consult with one another and as occasion requires with other members of the United Nations with a view to such joint action on behalf of the organization as may be necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security." The principal powers, in other words, were to act temporarily as the policemen of the United Nations. However, the division between East and West which developed almost as soon as the organization was founded made this provision a dead letter and at the same time stood in the way of conclusion of the military agreements.

#### **DEADLOCK ON ARMED FORCES FOR SECURITY COUNCIL**

The Military Staff Committee, organized during the initial sessions of the Security Council and General Assembly at London in January 1946, was asked by the Council to examine the Charter provisions on special military agreements and submit recommendations "in due course." A General Assembly resolution the following December pointed out that the problem of security was closely connected with that of disarmament; it accordingly recommended that the Security Council "accelerate as much as possible the placing at its disposal of the armed forces mentioned in Article 43 of the Charter." The Council, with Russia abstaining, then voted on Feb. 13, 1947, to request the Military Staff

<sup>5</sup> As a permanent member of the Security Council, the United States would be in position at all times to prevent use of its contingents by vetoing any Council decision to apply force.

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Committee to submit not later than Apr. 30 "its recommendations with regard to the basic principles which should govern the organization of the United Nations Armed Force."

The report which came in on the deadline date set forth a group of general principles in 41 articles. There was unanimous agreement on 25 of the articles; the Soviet Union was a dissenter on 14 of the remaining 16 articles. Although serious disagreement was limited to four questions, three of the four concerned matters basic to the ability of the Security Council to apply force efficiently and effectively. On all four questions it was a case of Russia standing alone in opposition to the four other powers.

Make-up of national contributions to the U.N. force formed the most important point of difference. The three western powers and China agreed that each of the five permanent members of the Security Council should make "a comparable initial overall contribution." They held that "In view of the differences in size and composition of national forces of each permanent member and in order to further the ability of the Security Council to constitute balanced and effective combat forces for operations, these contributions may differ widely as to the strength of the separate components, land, sea and air."

Russia, on the other hand, insisted that the permanent members "make available armed forces (land, sea and air) on the principle of equality regarding the overall strength and the composition of these forces." This was interpreted to require identical contributions by the five powers in all arms. And because the five powers initially were to furnish most of the forces required, the practical effect would have been to limit U.N. land, sea and air components, respectively, to a strength no greater than, or less than, the strength of the permanent member weakest in that component. With Nationalist China then possessing almost no navy and only a small air force, and France a small army, acceptance of the principle of equal instead of comparable contributions would have made it useless in most cases for the Security Council to consider using force.

A second point of difference with Russia concerned bases for U.N. forces. The four powers thought the special agreements should guarantee that bases would be made

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available, while the Soviets contended that the question should not even be considered. There was disagreement also on where pledged national contingents should be stationed while not in the service of the Security Council; the four nations asserted that they should be "so distributed geographically as to enable the Security Council to take prompt action in any part of the world," but Russia insisted that they should be stationed only at home or in ex-enemy countries. As a final point of difference, the Soviet Union wanted a time limit of 30 to 90 days to govern withdrawal of U.N. forces following completion of their tasks, whereas the other powers were willing to specify only that the forces should be pulled back "as soon as possible."

The Security Council took up the report of the Military Staff Committee on June 4, 1947, and debated it periodically for several weeks without making a break in the lines of division that had developed in the committee. Members of the committee continued to exchange views, but on July 2, 1948, they informed the Council that they could make no progress until that body had come to an agreement on general principles. The Council, however, took no action. Although the committee has met regularly over the past eight years, its sessions during that period have been no more than formalities.<sup>2</sup>

#### **SHIFT OF PEACE KEEPING TASK TO GENERAL ASSEMBLY**

When the Communist attack in Korea at the end of June 1950 caught the Security Council with no forces at its own disposal to deal with aggression—and able only by chance to avoid a veto of the recommendation that members go to the aid of the South Koreans—the search for effective U.N. measures to enforce peace shifted to the General Assembly. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, addressing that body on Sept. 20, 1950, urged the United Nations to "move forward energetically to develop a more adequate system of collective security." He declared that "The General Assembly can and should organize itself to discharge its responsibility promptly and decisively if the Security Council is prevented from acting."

The United States initiative culminated, Nov. 3, 1950, in adoption of the so-called "Uniting for Peace" resolution. The resolution provided that if the Security Council should

<sup>2</sup> The United States is represented on the committee by a vice admiral, an Air Force Lieutenant general, and an Army lieutenant general.

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be unable to exercise its primary responsibility to maintain peace, because paralyzed by the veto, the General Assembly might be called into emergency session on 24 hours' notice to make recommendations for collective action. Member states were asked, in that connection, to maintain elements of their national forces for possible service as U.N. units. The resolution established (1) a Peace Observation Commission to make on-the-spot surveys in danger areas and (2) a Collective Measures Committee to study organization of resources and manpower for keeping peace.

Three reports have been submitted by the Collective Measures Committee. The first report, in 1951, reserved consideration of a U.N. armed force for additional study. The second report, in 1952, discussed an earlier proposal of Secretary General Trygve Lie for international recruitment of a U.N. Volunteer Reserve, under independent international command, but noted that Lie had come to the conclusion that creation of a supra-national, self-contained standing force was administratively, financially, and militarily impractical at that time. The Collective Measures Committee's third report, in 1954, said the new Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjold, did not wish for the time being to proceed with the plan for a U.N. Volunteer Reserve; it was the committee's opinion that a primary objective in collective action against aggression should be to obtain maximum national contributions of effective military forces.

**PROPOSALS OF FORMER SECRETARY GENERAL TRYGVE LIE**

Various suggestions to get around the stalemate in the Military Staff Committee had been made by Secretary General Lie before his resignation in the spring of 1953. At the Harvard commencement in 1948 he proposed that "A beginning could be made . . . through the establishment of a comparatively small guard force, as distinct from a striking force"—such a force to be recruited by the Secretary General and placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Lie has recounted that he had in mind "a force of 5,000 to 10,000 men as a beginning."<sup>7</sup> This was at the time of Arab-Jewish hostilities attending establishment of the new state of Israel, and Lie was "acutely conscious of how different things in Palestine could have been had the United Nations had an international force at its disposal."<sup>8</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Trygve Lie, *In the Cause of Peace* (1954), p. 192.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 192.

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Following the assassination of Count Bernadotte, U.N. mediator, in Jérusalem in September 1948, Lie placed on the agenda of the General Assembly a proposal to create a United Nations Guard of 800 men—plus a volunteer reserve of 500—to assist and protect U.N. missions in the field. However, objections were raised to even this modest plan. As revised and, finally approved by the General Assembly in November 1949, it provided for only a still smaller U.N. Field Service. The Field Service, organized as a branch of the Secretariat in April 1950, is composed of uniformed but unarmed men whose chief job is to operate and maintain communications and transportation equipment. Though "not at all what I had originally intended," and "not in any sense an army or a United Nations guard," Lie agreed that the Field Service was "capable of maintaining a modest guard over premises occupied by the United Nations and valuable buildings located in demilitarized areas."<sup>8</sup> Early in the Korean war, the Secretary General suggested enlisting volunteers from all countries in a U.N. brigade or legion, but obstacles to putting the scheme into operation seemed to outweigh its potential advantages.

#### **REGIONAL AND PROPOSED WORLD SELF-DEFENSE PACTS**

Failure to work out the contemplated arrangements for putting troops at the command of the Security Council, and growing realization that the veto power probably would be fatal to U.N. efforts to prevent aggression by a great power, were factors behind formation of the North Atlantic alliance. Cooperation of a dozen (now 15) nations in setting up an international command structure, placing armed forces at its disposal, and otherwise planning for defense accomplished for the extensive NATO area what it had been hoped the U.N. Military Staff Committee would accomplish on a global scale.

NATO and other regional arrangements, in both the Soviet and the free worlds, are based on the inherent right of self-defense recognized in the U.N. Charter. Four articles of the Charter (51-54) acknowledge the right of individual or collective self-defense; state that "regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action" may be organized; provide for utilization of such agencies by the

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 198.

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Security Council for enforcement action; and reserve the right of the Security Council to be kept fully informed of, and in certain cases to authorize, self-defense or enforcement action by regional agencies.

A plan to make extraordinary resort to the Charter's recognition of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense, as a means of coping with the deadlock in the Military Staff Committee and the veto in the Security Council, was advanced by two U.S. senators three months after the North Atlantic Treaty was signed. The late Sen. Elbert D. Thomas (D-Utah) and Sen. Paul H. Douglas (D-Ill.) proposed in a resolution introduced in the Senate July 8, 1949, that Congress pledge support of a world-wide self-defense pact to be concluded under Article 51 and held open to all U.N. members. The signatories were to agree, in event of a Security Council stalemate, to go to the aid of a victim of attack if so requested by a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly which included the votes of three of the five permanent members of the Security Council.

Neither the Thomas-Douglas plan nor other schemes to make it certain that the United Nations would have armed strength in case of need made headway. The Uniting for Peace resolution opened the way for participation of the General Assembly in peace enforcement but left it to the discretion of member states to provide force to carry out recommended action against an aggressor. The ability of the United Nations to enforce peace or take other police action thus still depends on how far individual members are willing to go, at the time of an emergency, to back up decisions of the world organization.

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### **U.N. Police Action in Korea and Middle East**

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PROMPT United Nations action to check, and eventually turn back, the rapidly advancing aggressors who crossed the borders of the Republic of Korea at 5 A.M. on Sunday, June 25, 1950, resulted from a propitious combination of circumstances. The United States instantly made up its mind to assist the South Koreans; American forces in large numbers were close to the scene; and a Soviet boycott of the Security Council, then in effect, enabled that body to

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move with dispatch to a positive decision. The role of the United States obviously was vital; without American participation the United Nations would have been powerless to rescue the victim of aggression.

### **IMPROVISATION OF THE KOREAN POLICE ACTION IN 1950**

Meetings in New York and Washington put the operation into motion. When direct reports from the U.N. Korean commission stationed at Seoul confirmed the gravity of the attack, the Security Council was called into session. Late in the afternoon of June 25<sup>10</sup> it adopted a resolution sponsored by the United States, which (1) proclaimed a breach of the peace, (2) called for a cease-fire and withdrawal of the invaders, and (3) asked all U.N. members "to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution." The vote was 9 to 0. Yugoslavia abstained; the Soviet Union had walked out of the Council the preceding January with the announced intention not to return until Nationalist China had been ousted.<sup>11</sup>

At 10:10 P.M., June 26, it having become plain that the cease-fire plea would be ignored, President Truman ordered Gen. MacArthur at Tokyo to use air and naval units to give the South Koreans "cover and support." The American units were dispatched ostensibly in response to the Security Council's cease-fire resolution of June 25. It was not until 10:46 P.M. on June 27—24 hours after the order had gone out to MacArthur—that the Security Council adopted a second resolution recommending that U.N. members "furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area."<sup>12</sup>

Australian, British, and New Zealand warships in Japanese waters were placed at the disposal of the United States, June 28, to support the Korean action. The Netherlands offered its East Indies fleet on June 29. President Truman authorized dispatch of American ground forces on June 30. At a news conference the preceding day he had said the United States was executing a U.N. "police action."<sup>13</sup>

<sup>10</sup> This was actually more than 24 hours after the initial attack, which took place at 3 P.M., Saturday, June 24, New York time.

<sup>11</sup> The Soviet delegate resumed his Council seat, Aug. 1, 1950, without explanation.

<sup>12</sup> Because the special military agreements contemplated by the Charter had not been concluded, the Council could only recommend, not order, use of force against the aggressor.

<sup>13</sup> Although Congress was in session, it was not asked to declare war. Strong Senate and House approval of the action taken by the administration was indicated by overwhelming votes for extension of the draft act.

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Far Eastern naval and air units of Canada and France soon joined the forces aiding the Republic of Korea, but no ground forces other than those of the United States arrived on the scene until Aug. 27, when a British brigade landed. Australian and Philippine units got to Korea at the end of September, and Turkish troops in October.

By the end of 1950, assistance in the form of military personnel, transport, commodities, supplies, funds, facilities, and other items had been offered by 39 members in addition to the United States, by one state not a member of the United Nations, and by nine organizations. Fifteen members made offers of armed forces that were accepted, though in comparison with the contribution of the United States these military contributions were very small. It is quite clear that, if it had not been for the initial response of the United States, the offers of members of the United Nations would have been wholly inadequate for achieving their purpose.<sup>14</sup>

The 15 nations together sent only 45,000 combat troops to Korea, whereas the United States "contributed over 450,000 and actually rotated more than one million men through Korea."<sup>15</sup> Former U.N. Secretary General Lie has pointed out, however, that this was the "first international army to fight for collective security," and that such non-military contributions as the Norwegian and Swedish field hospitals, the Danish hospital ship, and the Indian ambulance team were "also of considerable value." He observed that "Though too much was left to the extraordinary self-sacrifice of the United States, the United Nations effort in Korea was, in a significant measure, truly international."<sup>16</sup>

#### DOMINANT U.S. ROLE AND THE QUESTION OF COMMAND

The preponderant role played by the United States had one practical advantage. It made it easy to solve the problem of command; with this country bearing so large a proportion of the burden, it was recognized at once that it should take overall responsibility for the operation. By a resolution of July 7, 1950, the Security Council (1) recommended that member states contributing to the Korean undertaking make forces or other assistance available to "a unified command under the United States"; (2) requested the United States to designate "the commander of

<sup>14</sup> Leland M. Goodrich and Anne P. Simons, *The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security* (Brookings Institution, 1955), p. 448.

<sup>15</sup> Francis O. Wilcox and Carl M. Marey, *Proposals for Changes in the United Nations* (Brookings Institution, 1955), p. 446. The 15 countries, in addition to the United States and the Republic of Korea, which contributed troops were Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom.

<sup>16</sup> Trygve Lie, *op. cit.*, p. 340.

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such forces"; (3) authorized the unified command "at its discretion to use the United Nations flag in the course of operations against North Korean forces concurrently with the flags of the various nations participating"; and (4) requested the United States to make "appropriate reports to the Security Council."

President Truman immediately designated Gen. MacArthur to head the unified command, and on July 15 President Syngman Rhee assigned to MacArthur "command authority over all land, sea, and air forces of the Republic of Korea." The United Nations Command, with headquarters at Tokyo, was formally established on July 25.

#### **U.N. INABILITY TO POLICE THE PARTITION OF PALESTINE**

More than two years before the United Nations moved so swiftly to repel aggression in Korea, it had failed to take up an equally direct challenge in the Middle East. After the General Assembly voted in November 1947 to partition Palestine, Arab leaders of the region made no secret of their intention to use force to resist execution of the decision. The General Assembly's Palestine Commission told the Security Council, in a special report on Feb. 16, 1948, that unless an international police force was dispatched to Palestine to keep order after May 15, the date set for partition, there would ensue "a period of uncontrolled, widespread strife and bloodshed."

The United States nevertheless adhered to the position that the United Nations did not have power forcibly to impose partition. Great Britain, the retiring mandatory power, refused to contribute troops to enforce a settlement not acceptable to both Jews and Arabs. At the same time, there was suspicion in the West that if Russia, which supported partition, should send troops to the Middle East, it would be for the primary purpose of gaining a foothold in that region. Proposals for preventive U.N. police action thus came to nothing in the face of great-power disagreement.

After the predicted full-scale hostilities had been in progress in Palestine for some weeks, the Security Council on July 15, 1948, finally declared that the conflict menaced world peace. An accompanying threat to apply sanctions thereupon brought a cease-fire. U.N. mediation and conciliation led to armistice agreements between Israel and its

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respective Arab neighbors the following year. Since that time, observers for the U.N. Palestine Truce Supervision Organization have been performing police duties of a sort. It was Canadian Gen. E. L. M. Burns, with more than two years of Middle East experience as chief of staff of the Truce Supervision Organization, who was chosen last November to command the new U.N. Emergency Force.

STEPS LEADING TO DISPATCH OF U.N. FORCE TO EGYPT

When Israeli forces invaded Egypt on Oct. 29, the United States promptly took the matter to the Security Council. At the meeting of that body on Oct. 30 Great Britain and France—already poised to intervene to enforce compliance with a 12-hour ultimatum to the combatants to cease hostilities and allow temporary Anglo-French occupation of key points along the Suez Canal—vetoed two resolutions calling for a cease-fire. It was their position that the Council could not act with sufficient speed to safeguard the lives of "many thousands of British and French nationals" in Egypt and assure "safe passage in the Suez Canal," that, on the contrary, the proposed Anglo-French intervention could be "the only effective action in a very grave situation."

Unable by reason of the veto to call for a cease-fire, and with British bombers already attacking Egyptian airfields, the Security Council on Oct. 31 adopted a Yugoslav proposal invoking the Uniting for Peace resolution to bring the General Assembly into special emergency session.<sup>17</sup> The Assembly convened late on Nov. 1, and early on the morning of Nov. 2 called for an immediate cease-fire and for prompt withdrawal of invading forces. During the debate Canada's foreign minister, Lester B. Pearson, urged that consideration be given to organizing "a truly international peace and police force" large enough to keep Israel's borders "at peace while a political settlement is being worked out."

On Saturday night, Nov. 3, the Assembly requested Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold to submit a plan for an international force "to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities" called for by the cease-fire resolution. Receiving his proposals on Sunday evening, Nov. 4, the Assembly voted shortly after midnight, 57 to 0, to establish

<sup>17</sup> British and French votes against the Yugoslav resolution did not constitute vetoes, because the resolution dealt with a procedural rather than a substantive matter.

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a U.N. Emergency Force for the Middle East. By the same resolution Gen. Burns was appointed chief of the new command. He was authorized to recruit officers from the observer corps of the Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine and from member states, the officers in both cases to come from countries not permanent members of the Security Council.

Involvement of two of the great powers in the Middle East conflict made it wise to restrict troop units as well as officers to nationals of the smaller countries, although the United States assisted in flying units to a staging area made available by Italy, whence Swiss planes carried them on to Egypt. Details necessarily were left to the Secretary General and an advisory committee of seven nations<sup>18</sup> set up by the Assembly. On Nov. 16—the day after the first contingent of the U.N. force landed in Egypt—Secretary General Hammarskjold arrived in Cairo to complete arrangements already made on a preliminary basis with the Egyptian government.

#### **UNCERTAINTY ABOUT DUTIES OF THE EMERGENCY FORCE**

Continuing uncertainty as to where the force would be stationed and what duties it would perform delayed plans for withdrawal of Anglo-French and Israeli troops from Egypt. Hammarskjold's report to the Assembly, Nov. 21, on the results of his trip failed to define the U.N. mission in specific terms; the Secretary General and the Egyptian government were jointly to explore such questions as the stationing of UNEF units and their supply.

By mid-December the U.N. force reached a total of 5,000 men, of whom 3,700 were on duty in Egypt and the remainder at the Italian staging area or awaiting transportation from their home countries. UNEF units moved into the Port Said area as Anglo-French forces started moving out. However, upon completion of the latter's withdrawal just before Christmas, Egyptian authorities took over and U.N. troops in turn began transferring to other posts. In the meantime, Yugoslav units of the force had been moving across the Sinai desert as Israeli troops withdrew.

With announcement that a separate "canal force," not a

<sup>18</sup> Brasil, Canada, Ceylon, Colombia, India, Norway, Pakistan. The resolution setting up the committee also approved the principle that the Assembly could not station a U.N. force in a given country without the consent of that country.

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part of the regular U.N. force, would be set up to guard the Suez Canal during salvage work, it appeared that the Cairo government would get its wish to restrict operations of UNEF to the Egyptian-Israeli frontier. Earlier reports that Nasser was demanding the right to revoke Egypt's agreement with the United Nations at will, and so compel withdrawal of the international police force whenever he chose, have not been confirmed.<sup>19</sup> Fears have been voiced that if the force is pulled out before a permanent settlement has been reached between Egypt and Israel, or even before new arrangements on freedom of passage through the Suez Canal have been completed, nothing will have been accomplished to relax the strains that caused the recent trouble and to improve the prospects for lasting peace in the Middle East.

#### **ADVOCACY OF STANDING UNITED NATIONS POLICE FORCE**

The success of the United Nations in organizing UNEF and putting it into the field in relatively short order gave rise to suggestions that similar U.N. forces be created for police duty in other trouble spots such as the Iraqi-Syrian frontier, Kashmir, and even Hungary. Organization also of a standing U.N. police force drew advocacy from a wide variety of sources, ranging from the foreign minister of Pakistan to A.F.L.-C.I.O. Vice President Walter P. Reuther and from the American Association for the United Nations to Sen. William F. Knowland (R-Cal.).

Roch Pinard, a Canadian delegate at the United Nations, told the General Assembly on Dec. 5 that the Middle East situation had demonstrated that there was a middle way between adopting resolutions and fighting a war. He said that UNEF was "not so much a fighting force as a police contingent endowed with international authority." Pinard asserted that now was the psychological moment to start organizing a permanent force prepared for future emergencies. At Karachi two days later Foreign Minister Firoz Khan Noon of Pakistan said there was no doubt in his mind that unless a permanent police force was created to insure the carrying out of U.N. resolutions, the United Nations "will have failed completely like the old League of Nations."

<sup>19</sup> Egypt was given the right in the beginning to object to participation in UNEF of troops of particular countries. It reportedly vetoed a Pakistani offer and the inclusion of combat troops in the Canadian contingent.

